Den republikanska presidentkandidaten och tidigare vicepresidenten Richard Nixon vann valet 1968 mot sin demokratiske motståndare Hubert Humphrey som var Lyndon B. Johnsons vicepresident. The New York Times toppade med rubriken ”Nixon wins by a thin margin” den 7 november 1968.
Posts Tagged ‘Val’
Front Page: Nixon vinner valet 1968!
Posted in Front Page, Historia, Kampanj, Media, Val, tagged 1968, Hubert Humphrey, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, Val on 12 januari, 2016| Leave a Comment »
Historia: Harold Macmillan premiärminister 1957!
Posted in Historia, Politik, tagged Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan, Historia, The Conservative Party, Val on 6 maj, 2015| Leave a Comment »
Harold Macmillan efterträder Sir Anthony Eden som premiärminister. 1959 skulle Macmillan och The Conservative Party vinna sin tredje raka valseger.
Kampanj: Nigeria går till val!
Posted in Kampanj, Politik, Strategi, Tidskriftsomslag, Val, tagged Boko Haram, Goodluck Jonathan, Muhammadu Buhari, New African, Nigeria, Patric Smith, The Africa Report, Tidskriftsomslag, Val on 28 mars, 2015| Leave a Comment »
VAL | New African hann inte mer än komma ut med sitt stora valnummer innan man sköt upp valet i Nigeria. Idag är det dags igen.
Valet skulle ha hållits i februari men sköts upp för att ge militären möjlighet att återerövra områden som kontrolleras av den islamistiska terrororganisationen Boko Haram.
Nu har man förlängt valet till på söndag i vissa delar p.g.a. av våldet, men också p.g.a. tekniska problem i vissa valbås. ”[A]bout 300 polling units out of about 150,000”, enligt en talesperson från valkommissionen Inec.
Valet förväntas bli det jämnaste sedan landet blev självständigt 1963.
Men även om det förväntas bli jämt har president Goodluck Jonathans oförmåga att hantera landets största säkerhetshot allvarligt skadat hans möjligheter att bli återvald.
Oavsett valresultatet kommer Jonathans misslyckande försök att besegra Boko Haram definiera hans tid som president enligt Bala Mohammed Liman i New African.
Boko Haram’s reign of terror has highlighted the weaknesses in the Nigerian state but also affected perceptions of the president. Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria’s president since the death of his predecessor Umaru Musa Yar’Adua in 2010, found himself tasked with the job of managing this insurgency early in his presidency. He is not considered to have risen to the challenge, and is often depicted as an indecisive leader, incapable of governing such a pluralistic nation.
Far from being brought to heel, under Jonathan’s watch Boko Haram has grown and morphed into something significantly more threatening, dangerous and destabilizing.
[…]
Jonathan’s communications strategy on Boko Haram has likewise been unsuccessful. He did not comment on the April 2014 abductions of over 200 girls from a school in Chibok for over two weeks after the event. Officials have made claims about the immediate return of some or all of the girls that have severely damaged his administration’s credibility. The girls have still not been rescued.
He did visit Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, on 15 January to commiserate with some of the displaced persons from the recent Baga attack and also to show support for the armed forces. This is a good gesture. However, many of his critics see this as too little, too late – just an attempt to win votes. Evidence for this more cynical view may be found in the speed with which Jonathan condemned the attacks on Charlie Hebdo in Paris, calling them “dastardly”, while failing to comment on the ongoing massacre in Baga.
At times, Jonathan has appeared unwilling to take Boko Haram as seriously as he should. Various blame games have further dented his image. His administration has previously suggested that Cameroon was not doing enough to counter Boko Haram’s cross-border threat. His wife, Patience, alleged that the abduction of the Chibok girls was carried out to embarrass her husband. Interestingly, this narrative has been picked up on by his supporters, who believe that the president’s failure to effectively tackle Boko Haram has to do with enemies within the government who continue to sabotage his efforts, rather than his or the military’s incapacity. The president’s 2012 declaration that the group had sympathisers within the government, while not providing names or evidence to support this claim, suggests that this is either another excuse or an example of weakness, with Jonathan failing to expose these individuals.
Huvudmotståndaren Muhammadu Buhari har byggt mycket av sin image på att han är mannen som kan ta itu med landets omfattande korruption. Men budskapet har modifierats under valrörelsen.
Patric Smith, redaktör The Africa Report, skriver:
In Abuja these days, politicians on all sides preface their remarks with a reference to a ‘dangerous time’ for the country.
A banker and strong supporter of President Goodluck Jonathan laments that neither the ruling People’s Democratic Party nor the opposition All Progressives Congress have shown a will to accept defeat at all, let alone gracefully.
”We don’t have a good record of managing close election results,” he says.
Nigeria’s most threatening crises have been resolved by the political, military and business elites stitching together backroom deals.
There seems little scope for compromise between backers of Jonathan – the first president from the Niger Delta, who started out with a serious agenda to reform power and agriculture – and his challenger Muhammadu Buhari, a tough former military leader whose anti-corruption record has made him wildly popular in the north and parts of the south-west.
Yet following claims last year by Lamido Sanusi, the former central bank governor, that the state oil company had failed to transfer more than $20bn to the government’s accounts, it is the determination of Buhari – himself a former oil minister – to promote accountability that boosts his poll ratings.
Now, his message to worried politicians and businesspeople is that he will focus on the future and not spend government time on probes into Nigeria’s multitudinous historic scandals.
Tidskriftsomslag: New African, februari 2015 och The Africa Report, mars 2015.
Politisk kommunikation: Bibi som ”Bibi-sitter”!
Posted in Film, Humor, Kampanj, Media, Politik, Strategi, Val, tagged Benjamin Netanyahu, Bibi, Bibi-sitter, Humor, Israel, politisk kommunikation, Reklamfilm, Val on 23 mars, 2015| Leave a Comment »
En av de mer uppmärksammade reklamfilmerna under det israeliska valet var Likuds ”Bibi-sitter” med premiärminister Benjamin Netanyahu i huvudrollen.
Humor har blivit en viktig ingrediens på sociala medier om man vill få fram sitt politiska budskap. Humorn får väljarna att stanna upp, istället för att zappa vidare.
“People won’t allow parties to ram messages down their throats anymore,” [kampanjstrategen Aron] Shaviv says. “To deliver messages effectively now you have to be entertaining. The ‘Bibi-sitter’ ad for instance was not only entertaining, it also delivered a key message: Who do you trust to maintain the security of your children?” Shaviv and Harow give all the credit for the win to Netanyahu.
“He was on message, razor sharp, and did every media interview we could come up with,” Shaviv says. “He carried the campaign and swung it to victory.”.
Strategi: ”Omvänd paketering” gav Likud segern!
Posted in Kampanj, Politik, politisk kommunikation, Strategi, Val, tagged Ari Harow, Aron Shaviv, Bayit Yehudi, Gil Hoffman, Isaac Herzog, Israel, Jerusalem, Kulanu, Likud, Tzipi Livni, Val on 23 mars, 2015| Leave a Comment »
VAL | Valet i Israel, Mellanösterns enda demokrati, blev en riktig rysare mellan Benjamin Netanyahu och utmanaren Isaac Herzog.
Trots dåliga siffror lyckades premiärminister Benjamin Netanyahu vända en väntad valförlust till en vinst.
När Kulanu, ett av valets vågmästarpartier, nu rekommenderar att Netanyahu får möjlighet att bilda en ny koalitionsregering ser det ut som om Likud blir valets stora vinnare.
Ari Harow och Aron Shaviv, två av Likuds kampanjstrateger, har berättat hur man lyckades vända valet för det stora regeringspartiet. Lösningen kallar de för ”omvänd paketering”.
Gil Hoffman har intervjuat de två strategerna för Jerusalem Post.
“The most important decision was to drive the electorate to two large parties,” Harow says. “We decided that if we create a situation where people have to decide who they want as prime minister, people will prefer Netanyahu over [Zionist Union challenger Isaac] Herzog.”
Therefore, the first slogan of the Likud’s campaign was “It’s us or them,” referring to Herzog and his running mate Tzipi Livni, whom the Likud’s polls found extremely unpopular. Shaviv advised Netanyahu from the start of the campaign to push what he called “reverse packaging.”
The strategy was to persuade voters on the Right that rather than vote for other right-wing parties and get Netanyahu, they had to vote for Netanyahu and get the other parties in the coalition.
“You vote for a prime minister and get the parts,” Shaviv says. “You don’t buy a radio and get a car with it. You buy a car and get a radio. You vote Netanyahu and get [Bayit Yehudi leader Naftali] Bennett and [Kulanu head Moshe] Kahlon with it.”
But Shaviv had to wait for the right time to raise the stakes significantly and have Netanyahu drive that message home. The more Netanyahu fell in the polls, the more voters on the Right would feel compelled to vote for him.
A poll taken Sunday night found for the first time that fewer than half the public thought Netanyahu would form the next government. Only after that did tens of thousands of Israelis change their minds and get persuaded by Netanyahu’s countless interviews that their security required them to vote Likud.
“It’s one of those delicious ironies of the campaign,” Shaviv says. “The more people think you aren’t going to win, the more likely you will win. “Reverse packaging was devised day one and triggered at the right time. Only when it looked like Netanyahu would lose did it make sense to say you need to vote Likud to get Kahlon and Bennett.”
In the last 96 hours of the campaign, the strategists targeted the 7 to 8 percent of the electorate that was right-wing and undecided. Most of them were choosing between the Likud and Bayit Yehudi or between the Likud and Kulanu.
To that end, Netanyahu announced in radio interviews Sunday morning that if reelected, he would appoint Kahlon as his finance minister. That stopped the tide of Likud voters considering voting for Kulanu. Voters who put socioeconomic issues first on their agenda, now had those issues taken care of and could feel comfortable using their vote to guarantee Israel’s security.
Bild: Foto av Flash 90. Israels premiärminister Benjamin Netanyahu kampanjar i Jerusalem under valet 2015.
Kampanj: Krig som strategi för att vinna val!
Posted in Historia, Kampanj, Politik, Strategi, Val, tagged Goa, Gyanesh Kudaisya, Historia, History Today, Indien, Invasion, Kampanj, Krig, Strategi, Tidskriftsomslag, Val, Wag the Dog, Yousuf Karsh on 28 maj, 2014| Leave a Comment »
HISTORIA | I ”Wag the Dog” låter presidentens rådgivare allmänheten tro att USA inlett ett krig. Allt för att vinna väljarnas sympati inför ett presidentval.
Snäppet värre är att verkligen inleda ett krig. Och det finns exempel på att det har fungerat i verkligheten.
Det var nämligen vad det självständiga Indiens förste premiärminister gjorde på 1960-talet, precis lagom för att det skulle påverka väljarna i en valrörelse.
Jawaharlal Nehru kunde vinna en tredje mandatperiod för det styrande kongresspartiet efter att ha ridit på framgångarna av Indiens invasion av Goa.
Gyanesh Kudaisya, som undervisar i samtidshistoria vid National University of Singapore, skriver i History Today:
On December 17th and 18th, 1961, on Nehru’s orders, Indian troops marched into Goa, an area of about 1,500 square miles on the country’s western coast, to ‘liberate’ it from the Portuguese, who had ruled the territory since 1510. In a brisk operation over 30,000 Indian troops overran this last colonial enclave, overwhelming and capturing about 3,500 Portuguese soldiers. Condemnation was swift, both from critics at home and abroad. C. Rajagopalachari, one of the country’s most respected elder statesmen, said that India had ‘totally lost the moral power to raise her voice against militarism’. Others pointed out that the military adventure in Goa was a ploy to divert the nation’s attention from the increasing Chinese border incursions (since 1959 the Chinese had occupied over 12,000 square miles of formerly Indian territory). Further afield, the action was ‘deeply deplored’ by Britain, the US, Canada, Australia, Pakistan, New Zealand, West Germany and other countries. Nehru was denounced as a hypocrite who preached non-violence and disarmament to the world, yet practised the use of force at home. A UN Security Council resolution against India was almost voted in favour, but for a veto by the Soviet Union.
[…]
In the election campaign that took place immediately after the invasion Nehru was able to strike a patriotic chord, capitalising on ‘restoring Goa to the Motherland’. His ruling Congress party was re-elected in 361 out of 494 parliamentary seats and was back in power for a third successive term. Yet, in spite of the criticism, no one could foresee that the triumphant note sounded over Goa also marked the countdown to the end of Nehru’s leadership. The military conflict with China that broke out in full force in October 1962 would be momentous for India, bringing about extraordinary tribulations for Nehru. In its aftermath came growing tensions with Pakistan, political unrest in the Kashmir valley and domestic criticism and challenges to his political authority.
Tidskriftsomslaget: History Today, maj 2014, vol 64, nr 5. (Fotot på framsidan är taget av den berömde fotografen Yousef Karsh. Karsh förevigade bl.a. Winston Churchill.)
Information: Indiska valet i siffror!
Posted in Information, Val, tagged Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP, Indien, Information, Narendra Modi, New Statesman, Time, Val on 28 maj, 2014| Leave a Comment »
VAL | Narendra Modi och Bharatiya Janata Party vann överlägset valet i världens största demokrati. Här är några intressanta siffror från valet.
Antalet röstberättigade väljare: 834 miljoner
Antalet väljare som röstade: 554 miljoner
Antalet partier som deltog i valet: 464
Antalet platser som stod på spel i valet: 543
Antalet elektroniska valapparater: 1,4 miljoner
Den procentuella andelen väljare som röstade på Modis parti BJP: 31 %
Valets längd: 5 veckor från den 7 april till den 12 maj
Beräknad kostnad för valet: 600 miljoner dollar
Källa: Time den 2 juni 2014 och New Statesman den 9-15 maj 2014.
Bild: En vallokal i Pune, Indien. AFP/Getty Images.
Strategi: Har populistpartier ”staying power”?
Posted in Politik, Strategi, Tidskriftsomslag, tagged EU, Europa, Europaparlamentsvalet, Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, Populistpartier, Sverigedemokraterna, Tidskriftsomslag, Val on 19 januari, 2014| Leave a Comment »
VAL | Partier på högerkanten ser ut att bli framgångsrika i EU-valet i maj. Men det leder inte automatiskt till några framgångar nationellt.
Och även om partierna skulle få möjlighet att påverka politiken även nationellt i större utsträckning än vad man gör idag är det inte säkert att de klarar av att hantera sådana maktpositioner.
Partierna på yttersta högerkanten är lika instabila som partierna på yttersta vänsterkanten. Den typen av partier har alltid bråkat minst lika mycket internt som med politiska motståndare.
Dessutom är många av populistpartiernas framgångar starkt kopplade till deras partiledares utstrålning.
Det är inte säkert att de partier som Marine Le Pen i Frankrike, Geert Wilders i Nederländerna och Nigel Farage i Storbritannien leder skulle överleva en period med mindre karismatiska ledare.
Frågan återstår dock hur de etablerade partierna skall hantera dessa partiers när de nu verkar kunna skörda framgångar i kommande Europaparlamentsval.
För att lyckas måste man först lära sig hur deras väljare tänker kring partierna. Att vifta t.ex. med högerspöket när det gäller Sverigedemokraterna är dömt att misslyckas.
Det är lika ineffektivt som om Alliansen nu skulle börja dra fram kommunistspöket för att varna för en eventuell medverkan av Vänsterpartiet i en kommande socialdemokratisk regering.
The Economist är inne på samma linje när man analyserar nationalistiska högern i Europa.
To raise the spectre of a return to 1930s fascism, however, is “not the right question,” argues Catherine Fieschi, director of Counterpoint, a British think-tank. Most of Europe’s populist parties either have no roots in the far right or have made a conscious and open effort to distance themselves from such antecedents. A better question is how far these parties can use popular dissatisfaction to reshape Europe’s political debate, and whether they can use that influence to win real power.
[…]
What they all have in common is that they are populist and nationalist, that they have strong views on the EU, immigration and national sovereignty, and that as a result they are doing very well in the polls.
The euro-zone crisis, and its aftermath, goes some way to explaining why—but it is far from a complete answer. The populist right is nowhere to be found in austerity-battered Spain and Portugal. But it thrives in well-off Norway, Finland and Austria. Between 2005 and 2013, according to calculations by Cas Mudde, at the University of Georgia, there are almost as many examples of electoral loss for parties of the far and populist right (in Belgium, Italy and Slovakia, among others) as there are of gain (in Austria, Britain, France, Hungary, the Netherlands).
But if euro-zone economics are not a full explanation, the crisis has been crucial to setting the scene for the potent new pairing of old nationalist rhetoric with contemporary Euroscepticism. Across Europe disillusion with the EU is at an all-time high: in 2007 52% of the public said it has a positive image of the EU; by 2013 the share had collapsed to 30%. The new identity politics is a way of linking the problems of Europe and those of immigration. It also taps into concerns about the way globalisation, defended by the mainstream political consensus, undermines countries’ ability to defend their jobs, traditions and borders.
[…]
Ms Fieschi at Counterpoint argues that the tension between the moderation needed for power and the outsider status that attracts a dispirited public makes such parties “fundamentally unstable” in a way that limits their growth. As Matthew Goodwin at Nottingham University points out, Austria’s Freedom Party imploded after it joined government in 2000 because it could not manage the conflict between protest and power. On this analysis, Europe’s populists may be near the height of their influence. Were the economy to recover and unemployment to drop, their message might fall on less receptive ground. Within the European Parliament, rivalry between them may thwart their high hopes for influence.
Läs mer: ”Europe’s Tea Parties”, ledare i The Economist.
Tidskriftsomslag: The Economist den 4-10 januari 2014.
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